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Abstract

In today’s political climate, when basic facts and reasoning are seemingly up for debate,
it is increasingly important to be able to identify well-reasoned arguments, regardless of one’s
political leanings, and to retain this skill throughout the lifespan. Research has shown, however,
a persistent belief bias—a tendency to judge an argument’s validity based on its conclusion’s
agreement with one’s beliefs, rather than its logical quality. Other findings suggest that belief
bias can be reduced by instruction to avoid belief bias. The current project seeks to explore
whether older adults, believed to be more prone to biased reasoning, respond differently to such
instruction, as well as to identify other potential individual differences in belief bias. Participants
(41 young adults, 33 older adults) completed an online survey in which they were asked to
evaluate valid and invalid syllogisms about political topics, both before and after instruction to
avoid belief bias. Contrary to the literature, there was no significant difference between the bias
scale scores or correction post-manipulation based on age group; however, response to debiasing instructions was inversely related to political conservatism. Findings call into doubt the
general statement that older adults are categorically more biased, and further research is
suggested.
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Manipulating Belief Bias Across the Lifespan
Which of the following categorical syllogisms is deductively valid?
All A are B.
No B are C.
Therefore, no B are C.
All tigers are mammals.
No mammals can breathe air.
Therefore, no tigers can breathe air.
Everyone motivated to work seeks jobs feverishly.
No welfare recipients seek jobs feverishly.
Therefore, no welfare recipients are motivated to work.
Because an argument is deductively valid if, assuming the truth of the premises, the
conclusion must also be true, each of the arguments above is a valid argument; their internal
logic is consistent. However, people have consistently struggled to solve such problems,
especially when arguments concern topics about which they have strong opinions.
Belief Bias
It has perhaps never been more important on a societal level to be able to separate sound,
well-reasoned arguments from those that fail to survive scrutiny. As reviewed by Hunt (2014),
however, researchers have long noticed effects of believability and familiarity (along with other
properties particular to an argument’s content) on study participants’ reasoning (see, e.g.,
Wilkins, 1929). Termed “belief bias” (Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, & Yopp, 1980), the phenomenon
has become one of the best-studied subjects in judgment and decision-making (see, e.g.,
Anderson et al., 2019; Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard,
1994; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). Broadly put,
participants are more likely to accept the logical validity of an argument if its conclusion is
consistent with prior belief, and to reject the logical validity of an argument if its conclusion
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refutes prior belief, regardless of the argument’s objective validity (Hunt, 2014).
Theorized Models for Belief Bias
Experiments attempting to quantify and understand the cognitive mechanisms involved in
belief bias have produced a complicated and confusing pattern of results that belies attribution to
a single theory (Klauer et al., 2000). However, many hypotheses have been advanced, of which
three have achieved the most empirical support. While discerning between the models is not the
primary objective of this study, it is worthwhile to consider them briefly.
Selective scrutiny and the dual-process model of reasoning. Extensive research
suggests that there are (at least) two separate ways in which people process information. While
terminology varies, the first type of information processing is generally understood to be
implicit, predominantly automatic and based primarily on feelings and intuitions. The other type
of processing is explicit, a predominantly conscious activity involving active reasoning and
analysis (Myers, 2010). Scholars of reasoning processes have applied this concept to their field.
According to Heit, “In these two-process accounts there is one system that is relatively fast but
heavily influenced by context and associations, and another system that is more deliberative and
analytic or rule based” (2007, p. 9). One hypothesis concerning belief bias suggests that the bias
arises when individuals heuristically apply the first implicit style of reasoning when they agree
with an argument’s conclusion, and only resort to explicit analysis of the argument if they
disagree with its conclusion. This model has come to be termed the selective scrutiny model
(Klauer et al., 2000).
Numerous studies have advanced support for the selective scrutiny model of belief bias.
Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) first suggested the model as a potential explanation for their
consistent finding over three experiments of an interaction between logical validity and
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believability of conclusion in participants’ acceptance of deductive syllogisms as valid: there was
a much stronger effect for actual logical validity when a given syllogism was invalid as
compared to when the syllogism was valid. Participants tended to accept invalid arguments with
believable conclusions but were warier when arguments were valid but contained unbelievable
conclusions. Moreover, participants who were in a verbal protocol condition in which they were
asked to think aloud as they worked out the problem tended to refer explicitly to the syllogisms’
premises when employing logic in their analysis but referred to irrelevant information (i.e.,
information not contained within the premises of the syllogism) when they were more swayed by
the believability of the conclusion.
Klaczynski and Robinson (2000) investigated the relationships between individual
differences, participant variables, and reasoning biases, including belief bias, in order to ascertain
when and what kind of individuals employ implicit versus explicit processing. Their findings
generally supported the dual-process model in that participants with a greater disposition towards
analytic reasoning showed less evidence of reasoning biases. Interestingly, their results also
indicated that “[i]f evidence is theory congruent, processing continues to be predominantly
heuristic. Cognitive vigilance, accuracy motivation, and efforts to prevent memory interference
are low; the data are assimilated into theory; and arguments for evidence acceptance are often
superficial” (p. 412).
Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) combined an investigation into belief bias and the dualprocess model of reasoning generally. According to their analysis, explicit analytical reasoning is
much slower than implicit heuristic reasoning. “The reason for this is that analytic processing is a
sequential process requiring use of central working memory and is constrained by its limited
capacity. By contrast, heuristic processes operate through massively parallel implicit systems
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that exert an unconscious influence on responding” (p. 382). They hypothesized that when
participants were required to evaluate arguments quickly—within ten seconds—they would show
greatly increased belief bias as they would be required to employ implicit heuristic reasoning
nearly exclusively. Their data confirmed their hypothesis; participants in the controlled-timing
group based their argument evaluations significantly more on belief and significantly less on
logic than participants in the free-timing group. Not only do their results strongly support the
dual-process model of reasoning, but they also lend credence to the notion that belief bias is
heightened when participants are prevented from fully scrutinizing the internal logic of a
problem.
The selective scrutiny model is not without its critics. Selective scrutiny suggests that
individuals examine the conclusion of an argument first; only on a finding that it disagrees with
their beliefs do they resort to logical analysis of the problem. Because belief bias results when
individuals ignore the logical value of the argument in favor of their agreement with the
conclusion, it would follow then that the logical complexity of the problem would have no effect
on belief bias, because in instances where belief bias controls the outcome, no logical analysis at
all has been performed. However, when Stupple and Ball (2008) varied the logical complexity of
the syllogisms in an argument evaluation task, they found that there was a greater belief bias
effect for more complex syllogisms. It must therefore be the case that even in instances where
participants agreed with the arguments’ conclusions, at least some logical analysis is
performed—a process not allowed for in the selective scrutiny and dual-process models.
Moreover, if participants were relying wholly on rapid heuristic reasoning before resorting to
explicit logical analysis, then it would be expected that they would spend less time evaluating
belief-consistent arguments and more time evaluating belief-dissonant arguments. Research,
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however, has found evidence for the opposite: participants tend to spend more time evaluating
arguments when they agree with its conclusion (Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006;
Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003). (Stupple and Ball (2008) found no
significant difference in response latency between syllogisms with believable and unbelievable
conclusions, though they did find that participants spent more time evaluating invalid syllogisms
than valid ones.)
Misinterpreted necessity. Reasoning biases are traditionally tested with formal
syllogisms. Typically, therefore, the response asked of participants is whether the conclusion to a
syllogism is necessarily true—that is, if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true—
because this is the analysis demanded in formal logic (Hunt, 2014; Hurley, 2012; Politzer, 2011).
The misinterpreted necessity model of belief bias supposes that participants, unfamiliar with this
particular logical demand, do not understand or do not engage with the parameters of the task.
Instead of rejecting an argument whose conclusion is not necessarily true given the premises,
participants instead determine whether the conclusion cannot be true given the premises (Evans
et al., 1983; Newstead et al., 1992). Then, as Newstead and colleagues (1992) summarized,
participants faced with the type of invalid argument in which the conclusion may be but is not
necessarily true, they “are more likely to base their responses on the only other cue they have
available, that is, their knowledge of the world” (p. 262).
This type of tiered approach to reasoning has been observed in various contexts outside
the laboratory which speak to its external validity. One key real-world domain in which the
processes of reasoning are paramount is service as a juror. Much research—and at least one
moderately popular network television show (Rotten Tomatoes, 2019)—has been devoted to the
topic of the malleability of juries and the manipulation of their biases in determining the outcome
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of a court case (for an overview, see Greene & Heilbrun, 2011). While numerous such biases
have been consistently identified, time and again studies have found that the most important
factor in predicting a jury’s verdict is the strength of the evidence with which they are presented
(Greene & Heilbrun, 2011; Myers, 2010; Visher, 1987). However, when evidence alone is not
convincing, jurors tend to disregard the instruction that they are then to find for the party not
bearing the burden of proof, and they instead resort to more-biased reasoning. According to
Myers (2010):
The facts of a case are usually compelling enough that jurors can lay aside their biases
and render a fair judgment. When the evidence is ambiguous, however, jurors are more
likely to interpret it with their preconceived biases . . . (p. 578)
Direct research into misinterpreted necessity in the context of belief bias has found
relatively ambiguous evidence itself. Certainly, the theory shows some merit. Newstead and
colleagues (1992), for instance, found that when participants were given determinate syllogisms
(that is, syllogisms which show the conclusion to be either necessarily true or necessarily false),
no belief bias was detected, whereas indeterminate syllogisms showed definitive belief effects.
Crucially for the present investigation, they also found that when participants were specifically
instructed to indicate whether or not the conclusion was necessarily true, they showed greater
accuracy than participants for whom logical necessity was not so stressed. However, this
reduction was seen only for believable—not neutral (meaningless)—conclusions. If uncertainty
about the criteria for a sound or unsound argument were driving belief bias, then more specific
instructions should also have helped participants determine the correct response when beliefs
were no help and they were presumably simply guessing. Because this was not seen,
misinterpreted necessity appears incomplete as the sole cause of belief bias.

8
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Mental models. The mental models theory of belief bias is based on Johnson-Laird and
Bara’s (1984) mental models theory of reasoning in general (Klauer et al., 2000). The theory
suggests that individuals generate a conceptual model based on the premises of an argument
against which they compare the given conclusion. If the conclusion is inconsistent with the
model, then it is rejected; if it is not inconsistent with the model, then it is retained as possible. In
some instances, alternative models are sought which might disconfirm the conclusion; in other
instances, the argument is accepted as valid at this juncture (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984;
Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989). According to the mental models theory, belief bias
arises when the reasoner’s first model generates a conclusion consistent with preexisting beliefs
which prompts him or her to accept the conclusion without generating additional models
(Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999).
A fair amount of research shows evidence that is consistent with the mental models
theory. Newstead, Pollard, Evans, and Allen (1992) tested the mental models theory directly
against the selective scrutiny model and the misinterpreted necessity model by using only
determinate syllogisms (i.e., those in which the conclusion either must be or cannot be true given
the premises) and varying the number of possible mental models that could possibly be
generated. For example, the premises “All widgets are blurbs; all blurbs are dongles” prompt
only one potential model—that of a widget which is also a blurb and a dongle—whereas the
premises “Some widgets are blurbs; no blurbs are dongles” prompt multiple models: that of a
widget which is a blurb (and therefore not a dongle) and that of a widget that is not a blurb (and
therefore may be a dongle). Newstead and colleagues (1992) found that when only one mental
model was possible (which would then by necessity be dispositive for the argument), no
interaction of belief and logic was observed, but when multiple models were possible, the
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interaction was seen (although, confusingly, in certain instances there was no main effect of
belief).
Torrens, Thompson, and Cramer (1999) measured participants’ reasoning ability and the
extent to which they generated alternative models in reasoning scenarios. Their findings
suggested that the more alternative models a participant tended to generate, the less susceptible
they were to belief effects and belief bias specifically.
Debiasing in the Context of Belief Bias
The logical next step after the identification of a particular bias is to investigate whether
people can be induced to reduce the bias’s effect on their reasoning. Indeed, Lilienfeld and
colleagues (2009) wrote, “research on combating extreme confirmation bias should be among
psychological science’s most pressing priorities” (p. 390). In this tradition, several “debiasing”
techniques have been tested against belief bias, and the consensus appears to be that debiasing is
possible, but only sometimes, and not completely. Evans and colleagues (1994) sought to
replicate Newstead and colleagues’ (1992) finding that enhanced instruction in the principles of
good reasoning could reduce the effect of prior belief on reasoning. In Experiment 1, participants
failed to respond to the enhanced instruction, while in Experiments 2 and 3, participants reduced
their bias but not enough to eliminate significant belief effects, whether or not the principle of
logical necessity was emphasized.
Anderson and colleagues (2019) also tested methods of debiasing, albeit less directly.
Rather than placing the burden on participants to eliminate their own bias, they investigated
whether the method of information presented (probabilistic, absolute, or graphic-based) could
influence participants’ bias. Once attention was controlled for, participants recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk did indeed show less bias when information was presented in a
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graphical format—allowing for easy visual comparison of various nested sets—as compared to
the other methods of information presentation.
Aging and Reasoning Biases and Heuristics
Generally, research on aging and reasoning has not been kind to older adults. Klaczynski
and Robinson (2000) investigated proneness to reasoning biases among a sample of 172 young
adults, 51 middle-aged adults, and 52 older adults involving faculty with the law of large
numbers, in the tradition of the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), and
the ability to critically evaluate hypothetical scientific research. On 10 of 12 bias measures,
middle-aged and older adults were more prone to “uncritically accept evidence favorable to their
positions and to dismiss, often with arguments based on principles of scientific inquiry, evidence
that depicted their beliefs as inaccurate and that portrayed the groups they favored negatively”
(Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000, p. 411).
Stanley and Blanchard-Fields (2011) studied differences in correspondence bias between
young adults and older adults, seeking to replicate findings that older adults tended towards
greater exhibitions of correspondence bias (Blanchard-Fields, 1994; Blanchard-Fields &
Horhota, 2005). Specifically, they sought to explore beliefs about behavior as potential
explanations. Indeed, they found that such beliefs mediated the relationship between age and
bias. Importantly, they found that, contrary to the popular theory attributing older adults’ bias to
diminished cognitive ability (see, e.g., Gonsalkorale, Sherman, & Klauer, 2009), fluid
intelligence was not a significant predictor of bias.
Goals of Current Study
The current study was designed to accomplish two main goals: to replicate the belief bias
effect generally, and to explore whether older adults’ greater bias is potentially attributable to
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differences in attitudes and beliefs, especially about reasoning.
Methods
Participants
Forty-one young adults (18 to 30 years old, n = 37 female) from the undergraduate
population of a large Midwestern university and thirty-three older adults (60 to 80 years old, n =
25 female) from the community were recruited to participate. Young adult participants were
compensated with course credit; older adult participants were compensated with entry into a
drawing for one of two gift cards.
Materials and Procedures
This study used a 2 x 2 (age group, pre-/post-manipulation) mixed (quasi-experimental,
pretest-posttest) design. Participants were asked to complete an online survey through Qualtrics
survey software which included an introduction which served as informed consent, a
demographics section (including whether or not the participant had had training in formal logic),
the 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Questionnaire (SECS; Everett, 2013), the
Shipley Institute of Living Scale vocabulary test, the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT)
Scale (seen most recently in Stanovich & West, 2007), and an Argument Evaluation Task (AET),
described below. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their own estimation about to what
degree their beliefs influenced their responses on the first and second sets of arguments, how
much more effort they expended to remain objective for the second set of arguments as
compared to the first, how many of the political arguments they believe argued against their
beliefs, and their estimation of the political orientation of the argument writer. Except for the
introduction and demographics questionnaire, the order and placement of the measures before or
after the AET was randomized. The survey was not openly available on the Web or indexable by
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search engines.
Argument Evaluation Task (AET). The AET consisted of an equal number of valid and
invalid1 categorical syllogisms whose content was related to four topics from the SECS
(abortion, limited government, traditional marriage, and welfare benefits), as well as eight
categorical syllogisms involving neutral categories (e.g., “widgets” and “blurbs”). Half of the
arguments were “for” the given topic, and half were “against” the topic. Participants were asked
to indicate on a six-point Likert-type scale the logical validity of the argument (from “Very
Weak, Invalid” to “Very Strong, Valid”) such that a response was either correct or incorrect.
(See Figure 1.) Responses were coded from 1 to 6 according to the participants’ own expressed
beliefs on each topic (or according to soundness in the case of the neutral arguments), such that a
higher score indicates greater agreement with prior beliefs, and then averaged to create a bias
scale score. A bias scale score of 3.5, then, would indicate no bias; a lower bias scale score
would indicate a bias against one’s beliefs. After each topic appeared four times (two “for” the
topic and two “against” it; two valid and two invalid), participants were presented with a screen
briefly describing belief bias and explaining that, for the remainder of the arguments, they were
to evaluate the arguments independently of their personal beliefs. (See Figure 2.) Participants
then evaluated 16 new arguments (and four neutral arguments), as before. Finally, participants
were asked to estimate to what degree they believed their responses on each set of arguments
were influenced by their own preexisting beliefs; how much more effort they expended to be
objective in the second set of beliefs, as compared to the first; how many arguments they
believed argued against their own beliefs; and to estimate the political orientation of the

1

To protect objectivity of items, invalid syllogisms were invalid by form, rather than due to an untrue premise.
Participants were instructed to assume the truth of the premises.
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argument writer.
The procedure for generation of AET items varied depending on whether the intended
item was to be valid or invalid. For valid arguments, the syllogistic structure was randomly
selected from the exhaustive list of valid syllogism structures (as enumerated by Hurley, 2012).
For invalid arguments, a logical structure was randomly generated and checked against the list of
valid structures to ensure no valid structure had been inadvertently generated. Then, a conclusion
proposition of the type dictated by the chosen structure was written such that it was either for or
against the given topic. A relevant middle term was chosen, and the two premises were thus
built. Finally, all three propositions were edited to better represent conventional English usage. A
sample (logically valid) item can be seen in Figure 1. It is important to note that the random
generation of invalid structures resulted in a wide range of invalid arguments, some of which
were nearly indistinguishable from valid ones, but some of which contained, for instance,
conclusions which directly contradicted one of the premises.
Careful readers will notice the incongruity between an argument’s binary validity—an
argument can be either valid or invalid, with no gray area—and the response requested of the
participant—that is, a rating of the argument’s validity on a scale of one to six. Ultimately, the
question asked of participants became, absurdly, “How many valid is this argument?” The
decision not to remain faithful to principles of deductive logic was made to capture the
uncertainty in a response that may have given rise to the misinterpreted necessity model of belief
bias, discussed above. According to the misinterpreted necessity model, participants who are
unable to determine the validity of an argument but are nonetheless asked to give a binary
valid/invalid response will resort to their preconceived biases, one of which is the target of this
study. It seemed worthwhile to be able to discern between incorrect responses corresponding to
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uncomfortable uncertainty as opposed to those corresponding to strong and stubborn conviction.
Indeed, one participant later contacted the researcher to lament the omission of a “no clue”
option (personal communication). On the assumption that participants unsure about an
argument’s validity (and not wholly controlled by beliefs) would be more likely to choose a lessextreme option, then, six possible answer choices were used.
The 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS). In order to evaluate
participants’ responses according to their own subjective beliefs about the given topics, a
measure of political beliefs and orientation was necessary. Therefore, participants were asked to
complete a modified version of the 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett,
2013). The scale asks participants to rate on a “feeling thermometer” the degree to which they
feel positively or negatively about twelve topics related to contemporary American political
conservatism. The SECS has shown good construct validity, with relationships to self-reports of
political party and ideology, as well as to constructs also related to conservatism such as rightwing authoritarianism, dogmatism, prejudice, and social dominance (Everett, 2013).
Typically, the SECS allows participants to respond in multiples of 10 on a scale from 0 to
100, with a response of 50 indicating neutrality about an issue. Because AET items were to be
coded according to beliefs measured solely by SECS item responses, it was necessary to disallow
participants from responding neutrally. Therefore, instead of a maximum of 100, participants
were allowed a scale of 0 to 90, with responses of 50 or greater interpreted as being “for” a given
issue, and responses less than or equal to 40 interpreted as being “against” the issue.
The Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (AOT) and Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT). To examine whether attitudes towards reasoning could account for age differences in
bias, as beliefs about behavior accounted for correspondence bias in research by Stanley and
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Blanchard-Fields (2011), participants were asked to complete the Actively Open-Minded
Thinking Scale (see Stanovich & West, 2007). The AOT is a forty-one-item scale that asks
participants to indicate on a six-point Likert-type scale their agreement with statements
involving, for example, the importance of revising beliefs in light of new evidence or whether
religious authorities should decide moral issues.2
Because the AOT is a measure of attitudes rather than behavior, the Cognitive Reflection
Test (Frederick, 2005) was also included as a measure of participants’ actual tendency towards
methodical, explicit reasoning. The CRT is a three-item measure which asks participants to solve
language-based arithmetic problems which have a strongly intuitive, but incorrect, answer. For
instance, the first item reads, “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?” The correct answer is five cents, but participants who fail to
work the problem explicitly are expected to answer that the ball costs ten cents.
The Shipley Institute of Living Scale vocabulary test. The vocabulary portion of the
revised Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Shipley, 1940; Zachary, 1986) was also administered to
participants in an effort to rule out differences in verbal ability as an explanation for different
performance on the argument evaluation task. The scale is commonly used in research settings
and consists of forty words of increasing complexity and rarity whose synonyms participants are
asked to select from a list of four possible options, and was seen here as appropriate for
estimating participants’ faculty with language.
Results
Contrary to the literature and to the predicted results, older adults showed no more belief
bias than young adults before the manipulation, t(55.997) = 0.104, p > .05, or after the

2

Per Stanovich (personal communication), items from the AOT may not be reproduced here.
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manipulation, t(72) = 0.411, p > .05, and showed no significant difference in adjustment to bias
scale score after the manipulation, t(72) = 0.337, p > .05. (Descriptive statistics are reproduced in
Table 1.) Participants were more accurate for invalid syllogisms than for valid ones, pairedsamples t(74) = 2.883, p < .01; however, against expectations, there was no overall belief effect
at all prior to the manipulation, one-sample t(73) = 0.181, p > .05, or after the manipulation, onesample t(73) = 0.621, p > .05, and there was no significant effect of the manipulation itself,
paired samples t(73) = 0.526, p > .05, despite the fact that participants performed significantly
better than chance both pre-manipulation, one-sample t(73) = 8.221, p < .001, and postmanipulation, one-sample t(73) = 10.626, p < .001.
Significant results only appeared, as it turned out, unintentionally. To preserve validity of
the SECS, the entire twelve-item scale was used, rather than merely the four topics of interest for
the argument evaluation task. Because OAs had significantly higher SECS scores than YAs,
t(72) = 2.30, p < .05, attempts were made to tease out age differences by controlling for
conservatism in a repeated-measures ANCOVA. The analysis revealed, quite unexpectedly, a
significant (linear) interaction between SECS score and the effect of the manipulation. In fact, an
attempted stepwise multiple regression analysis did find a significant regression equation, F(1,
72) = 5.59, p < .05, R2 = .072, but only SECS, ß = -.268, was entered into the analysis; age group
and scores on the AOT and CRT were not significant predictors (see Figure 3 for scatterplot).
One age effect did emerge, albeit also unexpectedly, and not in the context of belief bias
specifically. A significant inverse relationship was found between SECS score and the perceived
political orientation of the argument writer for the AET items; the more conservative the
participant, the more liberal they judged the person writing the arguments, and vice-versa, r
= -338, p < .01. However, when the age groups were examined separately, the correlation only
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remained significant (and was stronger) for older adults, r = -.551, p < .001. For young adults,
there was no significant correlation, r = -.207, p > .05. Indeed, the correlation was significantly
stronger for older adults than for young adults, one-tailed Fisher’s z’ = 1.68, p < .05.
Discussion
This study was intended to accomplish two main goals: to replicate the effect of belief
bias, and to determine whether older adults’ tendency towards biased reasoning is potentially
attributable to differences in attitudes about reasoning, rather than differences in raw ability.
While, contradicting the literature, neither goal was attained, unexpected findings in the data
suggest interesting avenues for future confirmatory studies.
The data failed to conform to the literature suggesting that participants tend to evaluate
the logic of arguments according to their agreement with its conclusion. Participants performed
significantly better than chance, and bias scale and accuracy scores were neither significantly
skewed nor leptokurtotic, so it is unlikely that any floor or ceiling effect is in play. A potential
methodological issue may explain the anomaly, however. Because the logical structures of
invalid arguments were generated randomly, many were very obviously invalid because they
outright contradicted themselves or the positions implied by the conclusions. For instance, one
item (which had a conclusion in favor of abortions) read, “All immoral things should not be
illegal. All abortions are immoral. Therefore, some abortions should not be illegal.” Indeed, this
explanation is consistent with the data, given that participants were significantly more accurate
for invalid syllogisms than for valid ones. Interestingly, this would constitute evidence against
the selective scrutiny model; if participants evaluate only the conclusion of an argument, then
whether the premises contradict the conclusion should have no effect, because the premises
would not even be considered.
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Even in the absence of an overall belief effect, the relatively high variability of bias scale
scores indicated that individual differences were clearly important as to whether a given
participant would be swayed by his or her beliefs, and indeed that was the case. The more
conservative participants were, the less likely they were to be affected by the attempt at
debiasing. To engage in post-hoc speculation, this would make sense—political conservatism is
associated with fear of threat and resistance to change (Jost, Glaser, Sulloway, & Kruglanski,
2003), and participants in this study were essentially told, “You are biased; change.” Follow-up
research specifically investigating the link between political ideology (and its underlying
personality traits and belief/attitudinal systems) and debiasing in the context of belief or myside
bias would be called for.
Perhaps the most surprising result was the mixed age effect, in that older adults did not
show more belief bias than young adults, in contrast with Klaczynski & Robinson (2000), but did
show greater correspondence bias than young adults, consistent with Blanchard-Fields (1994). If
it were true that older adults’ reasoning is more biased because of diminished cognitive capacity
in general, it would not follow this effect would extend to some contexts but not others. While
these data clearly are not sufficient to insist that bias in older adults is not due to neural and
cognitive decline, they do present an anomaly that that theory is ill-equipped to assimilate. To
engage in nearly pure speculation, it would not be inconsistent with these results to suggest that
older adults may retain their raw logical processing ability, but do not have the same checks as
young adults against proceeding to use those logical conclusions to make judgments about
individuals. This effect may not be specifically related to age, but instead cohort effects—it is
not unreasonable to suggest that there are cultural differences in play, given the vigor with which
young adults are now encouraged to avoid making individual social judgments based on
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generalities.
Limitations and Future Directions
In addition to the potential methodological issues discussed above, there are several other
limitations to the generalizability of this data that bear mentioning. First, sampling bias is a very
real risk: convenience samples such as that used here are always suspect, and it is wholly
possible that those older adults who would not only volunteer to take part in a cognitively
demanding study but also see it through to the end might be among those who found the task
easier—that is, those who would likely perform better.
Second, similarly, the use of an online survey such as this one—even one not publicly
open—came at the cost of ensuring participants did not “cheat,” and, again, there may be a
difference between those who completed the survey and those who abandoned it. Given a sample
size too low to satisfy assumptions for χ2 analyses, there is little way to eliminate the possibility
that such a difference would account for the effects or lack thereof seen here.
Third, it is possible that atmospheric effects muddied the analysis of the actual underlying
cognitive mechanisms in play. For instance, even though the instructions for the AET
emphasized the conditions for logical validity, participants still may have been unable to set
aside their rejection of an argument with untrue premises. If the arguments had been presented in
a form emphasizing the hypotheticality of the premises (“If it were true that [premises], then it
would be true that [conclusion]”), then then fewer participants may have been influenced by their
beliefs, regardless of the relevant individual differences. However, to do so would undermine the
external validity of the task, given the relative scarcity of such tentative arguments in the real
world.3

3

I am indebted to Richard B. Anderson (personal communication) for identifying this potential limitation.
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Several future directions for research were identified above, but there are others which
could be prompted by the results of the current study. Perhaps most intriguing would be to
explore the specific characteristics of logical tasks at which young and older adults perform
differently. The most pressing of these is to repeat the current study with specific “levels” of
invalid arguments: those that are self-contradictory and those that are merely indeterminate.
Additionally, some future study could explore within a single sample whether young adults and
older adults come to similar logical conclusions, but older adults fail to stop short of making
social judgments and applying those conclusions to individuals. Moreover, such a tendency
could be compared to measures of explicit endorsement of the sort of Bayesian rationality this
entails, which might shed light on whether any such relationship is due more to shared beliefs
rather than merely biological age.
Conclusion
In summary, the findings in this study suggest that the assertion that older adults are
categorically more prone to biased reasoning is suspect. While this study set out to replicate the
effect of belief bias generally and to explore competing explanations for the phenomenon, the
older adults studied did not show a significant difference in bias or instruction to avoid bias as
compared to young adults, except when they were asked to extend the results of their reasoning
to make a social judgment: estimating the political orientation of the argument writer. This
challenges the belief that older adults are categorically more biased than young adults in their
reasoning—future research should explore the contexts in which this is and is not the case.
Unexpectedly, the data also indicated that participants’ response to the manipulation depended
on their political conservatism, to the exclusion of other factors. Additional research could begin
to explore the facets of the broad construct of conservatism that interact with reasoning and,
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similarly, in which contexts.
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Table 1
Bias Scale Scores and Accuracies
Pre-Manipulation
Post-Manipulation
Average Difference
a
Bias Scale Scores
Overall
M = 3.50
SD = 0.47 M = 3.53
SD = 0.51 M = -0.05 SD = 0.76
OA (N = 33) M = 3.48
SD = 0.55 M = 3.56
SD = 0.55 M = -0.08 SD = 0.84
YA (N = 41) M = 3.50
SD = 0.39 M = 3.51
SD = 3.56 M = -0.02 SD = 0.72
b
Accuracy
Overall
M = 10.22 SD = 2.32 M = 10.70 SD = 2.19 M = 0.49
SD = 2.72
OA (N = 33) M = 10.94 SD = 2.32 M = 11.06 SD = 2.18 M = 0.12
SD = 2.23
YA (N = 41) M = 9.63
SD = 2.17 M = 10.41 SD = 2.18 M = 0.78
SD = 2.55
a
b
Note: A bias scale score of 3.5 is neutral. An accuracy of 8 represents chance-level.
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Figure 1. Sample AET item.
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Figure 2. Manipulation instructions.
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Figure 3. Post-manipulation bias scale score reduction by SECS score.

